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Ratzman: Relief in Equity against Probate of a Will Procured by Fraud

NOTE AND COMMENT
property, ' but there are no Montana cases on this point. Just
as the Montana court in the Swayze case implied that the statute
requiring a definite beneficiary' was not applicable to charitable
trusts, it seems reasonable that the court would hold that this
code section was not intended to apply to charitable trusts.
The other Montana statute which possibly places limitations
on the charitable trust doctrine is Section 91-104 (6977).' As
we have seen it interpreted in the Beck case, this statute was
used to prevent an unincorporated state institution from taking
by will. The Swayze case did not directly overrule the Beck
decision as the fact situations are distinguishable, and further,
neither the Beck case nor Section 91-104 (6977) was discussed
in the Swayze opinion.
As there seems to be no public policy in opposition to allowing charitable unincorporated associations from taking by will,
they should be allowed to do so. This could be accomplished by
the adoption of the cy pres doctrine previously discussed,' or by
M
to
amending Section 91-104 (6977), as California has done,"
expressly include unincorporated charitable associations.
J. W. BURNETT.
3.

To receive the rents and profits of real property, and pay them to
or apply them to the use of any person, whether ascertained at the
time of the creation of the trust or not, for himself or for his family, during the life of such person, or for any shorter term, subject

to the rules of sections 67-502 to 67-611 of this code; or,
4. To receive the rents and profits of real property, and to accumulate
the same for the purposes and within the limits prescribed by the
sections above enumerated."
'Supra, Note 28.
'tSupra, Note 7.
Note 8.
'Supra,
' 3Supra, Note 11.
'"Supra, Note 15.

RELIEF IN EQUITY AGAINST PROBATE OF A WILL
PROCURED BY FRAUD
Although Section 91-1101 (10042)1 of the 1947 Revised
Codes of Montana has been held to be in effect a statute of limitations, the running of which commences with the admission of
a will to probate,' and further held to be a bar to either direct
'R.C.M. 1947, §91-1101 (10042). "When a will has been admitted to
probate, any interested person may, at any time within one year after
such probate, contest the same or validity of the will."
'In Re Murphy's Estate (1920) 57 Mont. 273, 188 P. 146.
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or collateral attack on the probate,' a Montana attorney, or one
in many other jurisdictions with similar type statutes, need not
be defeated in all cases when he finds his client harmed by the
fraudulent probate of a will, even though the time prescribed by
statute for contest has run. Equitable relief may be possible.
This comment is intended to point out when and in what manner this limited relief may be had.
Early English equity courts set wills aside for fraud generally,' but it is now settled English law that equity has no jurisdiction to do so.' In the United States, fraud with respect to
the obtaining of probate of a will is said to be an exception to
the general jurisdiction of courts of equity to relieve in cases of
fraud.' Difficulty has been found in assigning any reason for
this exception other than that exclusive jurisdiction over the
probate of wills is vested in other courts. As Mr. Justice Bradley pointed out in the case of Broderick's Wifl :
"The courts invested with this jurisdiction should have
ample powers both of process and investigation, and sufficient opportunity should be given to check and revise
proceedings tainted with mistake, fraud, or illegality....
And one of the principal reasons assigned by the equity
courts for not entertaining bills on questions of probate
is that the probate courts themselves have all the powers
and machinery necessary to give full and adequate relief."
Statutes in some American jurisdictions give courts of equity
jurisdiction over will contests, but this has been held not a general equity jurisdiction.! In Bacon v. Bacon' it is said:
"The reasons given in support of the exception (to
equity's power to set aside decrees in will cases)' are generally declared in the opinions to be unsatisfactory and
illogical, and discussions usually end with the statement
that, whether for good reasons or not, the exception is
firmly established, and upon that ground must be adhered
to. "
It has been said that the cases could lead one to the con'See note 2, Supra,

'2 PAGE, WILLS (3rd ed. 1941) §570, p. 90.
'Allen v. McPherson (1845, 1847) 1 H.L. Cas. 191, 9 Eng. Reprint 727;
3 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) §1185, p. 2462.
630
C.J.S. Equity, §48, p. 381.
7
Kiely v. McGlynn (1875) 21 Wall. 503, 22 L.Ed. 599.
'Kelly v. Kelly (1918) 285 Ill. 72, 120 N.E. 515; Queensbury v. Vial
(1918) 123 Va. 219, 96 S.E. 173.
'Bacon v. Bacon (1907) 150 Cal. 477, 89 P. 317, p. 319.

"Words in parenthesis are the writer's and explanatory.
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elusion that relief in equity can be had in no circumstances from
a decree probating a will ;' notwithstanding such cases, equity
courts in many jurisdictions have given relief against a judgment probating a will from early times. Earlier authorities
maintained that such relief was given only "where the circumstances are exceptional" ' but more recent authority claims such
equitable action,
". .. merely applies to will cases the general rule of
equity jurisprudence that equity will not undertake to try
and determine that precise question which has been determined at law, and that even in a case of alleged fraud,
equity cannot assume jurisdiction where the fraud is not
extrinsic and can only be ascertained by the retrial of an
issue which has already been tried by an appropriate
tribunal. Equitable relief may be secured against judgments rendered by probate courts to the same extent that
such relief may be had from judgments rendered by other
courts.'

"

That the law in Montana on the subject is substantially the
same as that set out in this last quotation would seem to the
writer to have been established in 1936 by the decision in the
case of Minter v. Minter.' Plaintiffs in the Minter case, suing
as heirs, alleged that the defendants offered a purported will of
deceased, for probate, well knowing that the testatrix had not
signed it in the presence of two witnesses as required by law,'
although the attestation clause recited that she had done so. It
was alleged that in doing this, the defendants represented that
the facts set out in the attestation clause were true; that the one
witness who 'actually had been in the presence of the testatrix
when she signed was the only person called to testify concerning
the due execution of the will, and that the witness who had not
been in the presence of the testatrix when she signed was not
called, this being done to conceal from the court the true facts
concerning the execution of the will. Plaintiffs further alleged
that these acts were done with the intent that the plaintiffs
would rely upon the statements in the attestation clause, and believe that the will was properly executed, and further, that the
defendant's expectations were realized, and plaintiffs did not
therefore appear at the hearings to object to probate. Action
u3

FIEMAN, JUDGMzNTS (5th ed. 1925) §1185, p. 2460.
n6 8 C.J., Wils, §692, footnote 51, p. 944.
57 AM. Jus., Wills, §964, p. 631.

"(1936)
103 Mont. 219, 62 P.2d 233.
4
RC.M. 1947, §91-107

(6980).
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was commenced in District Court after more time had elapsed
than the year provided for contest in R.C.M. 1947, Section 911101 (10042)." The complaint asked that the order admitting
the will to probate be set aside, and that the defendants be restrained from taking under the will. The Court held that because the year provided for in Section 91-1101 (10042)" had
elapsed, the complaint was addressed to its equitable jurisdiction. In answer to argument of defense counsel to the effect
that a court of equity would not in any case set aside "a judgment or order entered in a probate matter," the Court said that
it had "heretofore attempted to make plain that orders and decrees made by the District Court sitting in probate occupy no
different status than orders and judgments in other civil actions." The Court cited two Montana cases as the ones in which
this had been established: In Re Baxter's Estate' and Hoppin
v. Long.' Neither of these cases involved the probating of a
will, however, and the Court did not make mention of the fact
that the probate of wills has historically been free from attack
in an equity court; instead, it treated the order in the Minter
case the same as an ordinary order or judgment in a civil action.
If an order probating a will is treated in this manner, it is then
subject to being set aside if it was procured by extrinsic fraud. '
To dwell for a moment on the type of relief possible when an
order probating a will is attacked because it was gained by extrinsic fraud. The cases which broke down the old prohibition
against relief in equity against a will probate did so either by
enjoining the fraud feasor from enjoying the advantage thus
gained,' or by holding him as trustee for the heirs or next of
kin. ' California cases still consider the proper remedy in will
cases to be the impressing of a trust. ' Because succession to an
estate partakes of the nature of a proceeding in rem, and because public interest would be best served by the devolvement
of such an estate to a new and competent ownership,' the writer
believes that the better solution to the problem is the imposition
'6See note 1, Supra.
"See note 1, Supra.
' (1936) 101 Mont. 504, 54 P.2d 869.
I(1925) 74 Mont. 558, 241 P. 636.
2'
Clark v. Clark (1922) 64 Mont. 386, 210 P. 93.
"Folwell v. Howell (1934) 117 Conn. 565, 169 Atl. 199.
'Gaines v. Chew (1844) 43 U.S. 619, 11 L.Ed. 402; Patterson v. Dickerson (1912) 113 C.C.A. 252, 193 Fed. 328; Brazil v. Silva (1919) 181 Cal.
490, 185 P. 174; Seeds v. Seeds (1927) 116 Ohio State 144, 156 N.E. 193,
52 A.L.R. 761.
"Gale v. Witt (1948) ...... Cal ....... 188 P.2d 755.
"See note 7, Supra.
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of a trust, rather than a setting aside of the decree admitting
the will to probate, which the Court in the Minter case intimated
would be done. As was suggested in an older Montana case dealing with fraud, Hoppin v. Long,' it would be better here for the
District Court sitting in equity to treat the proceeding at law
as valid, and grant needed relief against the consequences of the
fraud. Sanctity of title to property would be better maintained
by the trust device, and the in personam aspect of resort to
equity would not needlessly be disturbed. The difference in
treatment can have more than formal results. Equity in imposing a trust can well protect the bona fide purchaser for value,
while making the trust fully operative against volunteers or
those with notice.'
After deciding that the rule in Montana is that an order
probating a will can be set aside by a suit in equity even after
the statute of limitations for contest has run, the Court in the
Minter case proceeded to discuss the instances in which this could
be done. Quoting a statement in an earlier Montana case, Clark
v. Clark,' the Court observed that:
",The power of a court of equity to grant relief from a
judgment obtained by fraud is inherent, and this relates
to decrees in equity as well as to judgments at law, but not
every fraud committed in the course of a judicial determination will furnish ground for such relief. The acts for
which a judgment or decree may be set aside or annulled
have reference only to fraud which is extrinsic or collateral to the matter on which the judgment was rendered. "
This statement leads logically to a general discussion of extrinsic
fraud in general and as recognized by the Montana decisions.
The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud has
been called a nebulous' one for good reason. A fraud in the procedure of probate whereby the successful party gains an unfair
advantage, as distinguished from fraud in the original transaction, gives basis for the differentiation.' One of the earliest
Montana cases dealing with extrinsic fraud' laid down the requirement that it should be found that there was never a decision
in. a real contest over the controverted matter. The leading ease
'See note 20, Supra.
'3 ScoTT, TRusrs (1939) §474, p. 2346.

"See note 20, Supra.

"CaIdwell v. Taylor (1933) 218 Cal. 471, 23 P.2d 758, 88 A.L.R. 1194.
'2 PAGE, WLLS (3rd ed. 1941) §578, p. 93.
8"Kennedy v. Dickie (1906) 34 Mont. 205, 85 P. 982.
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of United States v. Throckrnorton" was relied upon by the court
in the Minter case. In the Throckmorton case Mr. Justice Miller
stated that fraud was extrinsic when,
"...

. the unsuccessful party has been prevented from ex-

hibiting his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him
by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a
false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant
never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance
by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority assumes to represent a party
and connives at his defeat; or where the attorney regularly employed corruptly sells out his client's interest to the
other side,-these, and similar cases which show that there
has never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the
case for which a new suit may be sustained to set aside
and annul the former judgment or decree .... "
The Montana case of Clark v. Clark' gave as examples of extrinsic fraud,
..

. where a party residing without the jurisdiction of

the court is induced by false pretenses or representations
to come within the jurisdiction for the sole purpose of
getting personal service of process upon him, or where,
through the instrumentality of the successful party, the
witnesses of his adversary are forcibly or illegally detained
from court or bribed to disobey the subpoenas served upon
them, or where a judgment is obtained in violation of an
agreement between the parties."
The court found that the fraud alleged in the Minter case
(defendant's failure to disclose the improper execution of the
will) was directly in issue at the hearing on petition for admission of the will to probate, and followed an Oregon case to the
effect that, as a policy matter, there should be an end to litigation, and that neither perjured testimony nor fraudulent allegations used in obtaining the judgment in a case constitute extrinsic fraud. Because the plaintiff's complaint alleged at most
intrinsic fraud, the court further decided that there was no
ground for equitable relief, and that the lower court was correct
in sustaining a demurrer to plaintiff's complaint.
Because in argument counsel for both plaintiff and defendant relied upon the California case of Caldwell v. Taylor,"' and
"'(1878) 98 U.S. 61, 25 L.Ed. 93.
3See note 20, Supra.
"Dixon v. Simpson (1929) 130 Ore. 211, 279 P. 939.
"'See note 28, Supra.
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because the court itself cited passages from it in reporting the
Minter case, an examination of Caldwel v. Taylor would seem
worthwhile.
The plaintiff alleged in Caldwell v. Taylor that the defendant tricked plaintiff's father into marriage; that the defendant
further tricked the father into believing that she was unmarried,
when in fact she was married, and a woman of the streets. Plaintiff's father, because of this belief, made a will in which the
defendant was the sole beneficiary. The fraud alleged in the
case, held to be extrinsic, was that the defendant deliberately
misrepresented her true name, former marital status, and moral
character, in answer to direct questions on the point put to
defendant by the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged that the fraud
was intended to, and did, prevent the plaintiff from discovering
evidence to support a contest of the will within the statutory
period. The plaintiff used as a theory in his suit in equity the
general scheme of fraud not only in including the making of
the will, but also fraud practiced directly on himself, so that he
did not have his day in court. Even though the six months
period allowed for contest under the California Code had run,
the defendant was held as constructive trustee of the benefits
for the plaintiff, testator's son and only heir.
The Minter case differs from Caldwell v. Taylor in that in
the former there was neither allegation nor proof that the proponents of the will made representations of any kind directly
to the plaintiff. At most there was a concealment of the facts
and false testimony as to the proper execution of the will. In
finding such action to be at the most intrinsic fraud, the Montana Supreme Court followed the rule followed in many cases
that perjury alone is not a ground for equitable relief, if the
trial was proper in all other respects. It has even been held
that perjury on the part of a witness who was bribed by the
successful party to the suit is not extrinsic fraud." It has been
suggested that perjury be considered grounds for equitable relief by one who admitted that perjury was the "chief example
of intrinsic fraud.' ' It would seem to the writer that perjury
is properly treated as intrinsic fraud for the reasons set forth
fHarvey

v. Griffiths (1933) 133 Cal. App. 17, 23 P.2d 532; Steen v.
March (1901) 132 Cal. 616, 64 P. 994; La Salle v. Peterson (1934) 221
Cal. 739, 32 P.2d 612; Rudy v. Slotwlnsky (1925) 73 Cal. App. 459, 238
P. 783; Pico v. Cohn (1891) 91 Cal. 129, 25 P. 970, 27 P. 537.

"Pico v. Cohn, see note 35, Supra.
"Aldwell, Equitable Relief from Judgments, Orders, and Decrees Obtained by Fraud, 23 CAL. LAw REv. 79 (1934), p. 84-5.
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in an excellent annotation on the subject,' in which it is contended that:
"The doctrine which seems to be supported by the sounder
reasoning, however, is that mere perjury is not ground for
such relief, where the truth of the perjured evidence was
necessarily at issue and determined by the court or jury in
the original action, and the party committing or suborning the perjury does not, other than by the mere utterance or procurement thereof, conceal from the opposing
parties the means by which the falsity of the evidence
might be discovered, or otherwise mislead the latter ...
to grant relief on account thereof . . . would be to try
anew the issue involved and determined in the original
action."
The Minter case is the only reported Montana case found
by the writer that involved alleged extrinsic fraud in connection
with the probate of a will, but the Montana Supreme Court has
been consistent in looking with a jealous eye upon suits which
have for their object the setting aside of a judgment at law for
extrinsic fraud in other cases involving ejectment,' mortgages,'
and intestate succession.' The Montana view of extrinsic fraud
could be said to be strict when a decision from another state
such as the one allowing equitable relief because the contestants
were ignorant of such defenses as fraud and undue influence at
the time probate was procured" is considered.
Examples cited by a leading authority" will illustrate the
manner in which the courts apply the above mentioned principles
as to extrinsic and intrinsic fraud. Fraud was found intrinsic
when the proponent omitted to disclose that the testator was incompetent, or that the will was obtained by fraud, or that a
number of persons had conspired to exercise undue influence
upon the testator, or that the will which was offered for probate
was a forgery, or that a codicil which modified the will was in
existence. Fraud was found extrinsic when the proponent acted
to conceal from the contestant that the testator lacked capacity,
or acted to omit the name of a legatee from the petition for probate, or failed to disclose the existence of the testator's heir.
A breach of duty to speak or to make disclosures has been
'88 A.L.R. 1201, p. 1207.
saKennedy v. Dickie, see note 30, Supra.
"Dunne v. Yund (1916) 52 Mont. 24, 155 P. 273; Frisbee v. Coburn
(1935) 101 Mont. 58, 52 P.2d 882.
'Hoppin v. Long, see note 19, Supra.
"Folwell v. Howell, see note 21, Supra.
"32 PAGE, WILLS (3rd ed. 1941) §578, p. 94-5.
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adjudged extrinsic fraud when a confidential relationship has
existed between parties."
A final thing to remember when considering the problem of
equitable relief for extrinsic fraud is that a party must come
into equity deserving of relief in all respects. As one writer has
noted:"
"... the usual requirements of equity must be met-the
plaintiff must have no other adequate remedy, he must
himself be without fault, and he must be diligent in seeking relief when he discovers the fraud. In addition, he
must show that the result would have been different had
the fraud not been practiced, in that he had a valid defense or case; and he must not have been negligent in allowing the-opposing party to practice the alleged fraud."
Summing up, the Montana Supreme Court clearly indicated
in the Minter case that it would grant equitable relief even after
the year provided for in R.C.M. 1947, Section 91-1101 (10042)
had elapsed; relief will not be granted for all types of fraudextrinsic fraud must be alleged and proved; the attitude of the
court in the Minter case was that the public interest in an end
to litigation was of great importance, and that fraudulent allegations, perjured testimony, or a mere concealment of a fact
without something more of a collateral nature directly designed
to prevent a potential contestant from having his day in court
do not constitute fraud of an extrinsic nature, and will not support an action in equity for the purpose of obtaining relief
against a fraudulently procured probate of a will.
DEAN F. RATZMAN.
"Ferguson v. Wachs (1938) 26 F.2d 910: Sohler v. Sohler (1902) 135
Cal. 323, 67 P. 282; Crow v. Madsen (1939) 31 Cal. App. 240, 87 P.2d
903. Sohler v. Sohler points up the difference between extrinsic and
intrinsic fraud nicely. In that case, a widow, executrix under husband's will, conspired with her son, who was not the son of the testator, to procure for him a share of property devised to testator's children. The widow filed a petition naming such children, and alleged
that her son was one of them; she thus obtained a decree that the son
was one of testator's children, and that he was entitled to a share of
his estate. The testator's children had no notice of this fraudulent
action. The fact that the executrix and her son succeeded by false
and perjured testimony in obtaining a favorable decision In probate was
held to be intrinsic fraud, for this was an issue In the case. The Court
found, however that the position of the executrix as mother and natural guardian of the minor plaintiffs was such that she was under an
obligation to protect their legal rights, and to see that their claims
were properly presented before the probate court. The fraud in pushing the false claim to heirship was found to be extrinsic to the case
In that it prevented the minor children from being properly represented
at the hearing. The son was declared to hold title as trustee of the
minor plaintiffs.
"Aldwell, op. cit., note 37, p. 79, 80.
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